Neo-Cartesianism in Generative Grammar by Narita Hiroki
Neo-Cartesianism in Generative Grammar
Hiroki Narita
Tokai University
1 Introduction
A conceptual barrier preventing a natural science of the mind was first posed as a by-product of
Descartes’s metaphysical mind-body dualism, but it was later eliminated by Newton. However, at the same
time, the unbounded creativity in human cognition (externalized via human speech) essentially remains as
much a mystery as Descartes observed with puzzlement, and the serious naturalistic inquiry into the mind
is presumably only possible when the issues surrounding unbounded creativity are circumvented, in much
the same way as Descartes did in his construction of mechanical philosophy. Thus, natural sciences of the
mind, if any, would be both methodologically un-Cartesian1 and epistemologically Cartesian, in that they
must reject Descartes’s mind-body dualism as a conceptual barrier for cognitive sciences, while nevertheless
respecting Descartes’s advice to avoid insurmountable complexities of unbounded creativity. Among such
inquiries, the minimalist program for linguistic theory is further metaphysically trans-Cartesian, too, in that it
aims at discovering so-called “third-factor” principles, i.e., domain-general laws of nature that are not specific
to language and cross-cut physical as well as mental aspects of the world. In this squib, I will briefly argue
that generative grammar couched in the minimalist-biolinguistic program is essentially such a neo-Cartesian
project.
2 Methodological un-Cartesianism
2.1 Departing from Descartes’s mind-body dualism The astounding progress made in natural science
over the past few centuries is arguably one of the noblest achievements in the whole history of humankind.
Ever since the “Scientific Revolution” in the 17th century, when this human-made enterprise came to take its
modern shape, there have been a growing number of intriguing discoveries regarding the deep nature of the
universe that had previously been otherwise inaccessible to human cognition. The progress in this scientific
inquiry has been made primarily in the domain of what is termed the physical, subsuming the chemical
and atomic structure of matter, motion of objects through space-time, electrical and magnetic forces causing
motion at a distance, functions and structures of cells of different organisms, and so on. These achievements
are so impressive and appealing that many scientists and philosophers have been inclined to scientific realism,
the belief that the theoretical postulates of successful scientific research reflect the theory-independent reality
in the universe, even when the relevant postulates are not themselves observable.
One may wonder whether similar progress is ever possible in the study of the mental, what is going on
“inside the head.” Science is a particular human enterprise that can attain a special sort of understanding
when the problems can be simplified enough. Descartes, the father of modern science, first put forward his
metaphysical mind-body dualism essentially as a naturalistic hypothesis, which posits that the physical realm,
or the first substance that Descartes called res extensa, is causally closed in terms of the principles of contact
mechanics (mechanical philosophy). He conjectured that we can pursue a rigorous mechanical understanding
of the physical with appropriate simplifying assumptions. At the same time, he clearly saw the limitations of
his mechanical scientific inquiry, most notably in his observation of the uncaused and unbounded creativity
of normal language use by ordinary people. He was led to postulate a second substance called res cogitans
(the mental) as the source of the boundless creativity of human linguistic behaviors, and he supposed that
in order to investigate this domain, we have to seek some metaphysical and methodological alternatives to
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the principles and methodology that he proposed to adopt for the science of res extensa. Then, prospects for
the science of the mental are, for Descartes, contingent upon how we can suitably develop such alternative
principles and methodology, which was never achieved within the classical Cartesian framework.
Descartes’s metaphysical mind-body dualism was quite congenial to our common-sense understanding
of the world, but it was nevertheless effectively dissolved by Newton. Newton’s finding of universal gravity
was essentially an acknowledgment that there exists a deep physical force that affects physical objects without
the medium of contact, hence not closed by contact mechanics. Therefore, Newton’s work was, much to his
dismay, a death sentence for the then-beloved Cartesian science of the material world. In Hume’s (1756:542)
words, “While Newton seemed to draw the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he showed at the same
time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; and thereby restored [Natures] ultimate secrets to that
obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will remain.”
This effectively eliminated a conceptual barrier for the natural science of the mind (Chomsky, 1995a,
2000b), which, in retrospect, formed the basis for the 20th century “second cognitive revolution” (Jenkins
2000:2; cf. Chomsky 1994:35), during which what we now call the cognitive sciences emerged. The progress
was most notably made in the study of the mechanisms (but not use) of human language and of vision (see
in particular Marr 1982 for the study of vision). The essential finding in these endeavors was that there are
substantive computational mechanisms in the mental aspects of the world that can be studied using the same
principles and methodologies as for the physical sciences.
Contemporary cognitive scientists are, in this sense, methodologically un-Cartesian, in that they reject
Descartes’s mind-body dualism as a methodological barrier preventing such naturalistic inquiry.
Specifically for language, contemporary generative linguists have come to terms with the idea that
language should be studied using the same methods and criteria as other natural sciences. Chomsky
(1995a, 2000b) proposes to call this attitude methodological naturalism, which just amounts to avoiding
any stereotypes and preconceptions regarding how we proceed in studying the object in question.
It is hardly necessary to add that methodological naturalism is not always shared by cognitive scientists
and philosophers outside of the generative camp. In fact, many researchers of the mind still adhere to the
idea that what is going on inside the head should be approached differently from other physical objects in the
world. To highlight the contrast, Chomsky proposes to call this dominant stance methodological dualism. It
is thus commonplace to adopt certain presumptions about language and mind, e.g., that any mental-cognitive
objects should be in principle accessible to consciousness, or that mental computations should be such that
they can be modeled and simulated by particular computer models (such as neural networks). Methodological
un-Cartesianism is an attempt to refrain from any such dualist preconceptions, and rather to seek the “best”
theories of the object of inquiry in neutral terms. See Chomsky (1995a, 2000b) for discussion.
2.2 Semantic naturalism as methodological dualism One prominent example of methodological
dualism has been discussed in the philosophical literature. This case concerns the “naturalization” of
semantics, often referred to as “semantic naturalism” (see Dretske 1981; Fodor 1990, 1991, 1994, 2008,2
Loewer & Rey 1991; Boghossian 1991; Loewer 1997, to name just a few). To take a formulation given by
Loewer’s (1997) “A guide to naturalizing semantics,” semantic naturalism concerns the question in virtue of
what natural language expressions are associated with relations to mind-external entities like truth-conditional
contents and reference, and seeks to provide some answer to this question in some non-mentalistic terms.
Those philosophers whom Loewer (1997) calls “semantic naturalizers” regard it as a serious philosophical
problem that the linguistic (for them primarily semantic) properties they postulate, be they truth-conditions,
reference, intentionality, etc., are prima facie not conceivable as something that physical entities can possess,
and they hope that the ontology of these semantic postulates somehow bottoms out in the ‘safer’ ontology
of the “physical,” i.e., materials discernible by our common-sense perspective on the world, or better yet, by
contemporary physics. Most of the traditional semantic naturalizers accept the position that is usually called
“physicalism,” a philosophical doctrine holding that everything that exists in the world is “physical” in this
sense, and conceive of their problem of semantic naturalism as an attempt to reformulate, or in fact reduce,
postulated semantic entities to physical ones. Thus, for example, Fodor (1994) notes,
[N]aturalizability ... is a general constraint upon the ontology of all the special sciences. It’s a
2 See also Rønning (2008) for overview of Fodor’s naturalization program. But see also McGilvray (2002) for a serious
criticism of the Fodorian representational theory of mind.
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methodological consequence of our conviction—contingent, no doubt, but inductively extremely
well confirmed—that everything the sciences talk about is physical. If that is so, then the
properties that appear in scientific laws must be ones that it is possible for physical things to
have, and there must be an intelligible story to tell about how physical things can have them.
(Fodor, 1994:5)
Traditional semantic naturalizers share with Fodor the view that special sciences such as linguistics (for them
primarily semantics, understood as the study of language-world relations), or cognitive sciences in general,
should meet the condition of naturalizability in this sense.
The course of naturalization of linguistics/semantics envisaged by these semantic naturalizers can be
summarized as follows:
(1) Traditional approach to the naturalization of linguistics/semantics:
a. Assume what is “semantic” (i.e., entities and relations required by one’s prior conception of
linguistic semantics)
b. Assume the ontology of the “physical”
c. Provide re-characterizations of (a) in terms of either reduction to or supervenience on (b)
If we interpret Fodor and other semantic naturalizers’ position moderately as just expressing a wish to find a
way to bridge the gap between (the ontology of) what their linguistic-semantic theories posit and what other
core natural sciences do, then this wish would be more or less a concern for the problem of unification of these
yet divergent disciplines. Under this weak interpretation, methodological naturalists would be sympathetic to
this wish for eventual unification, with the proviso that the course of naturalization need not take the form of
reduction as in (1-c) (see Chomsky 1995a, 2000b; we will return to this point later).
One may naturally ask the following question: is the traditional semantic naturalism (1) the only possible
course of unification of the study of natural language semantics and other ‘core’ natural sciences? It should be
noted that over the years, Chomsky and other generative biolinguists have been arguing for the view that there
exists a promising alternative, namely a purely internalist approach to the unification problem, a perspective
which will be articulated below.
Note that traditional semantic naturalism requires a prior definition of what counts as “physical”
as its starting hypothesis (step (b) in (1)). Indeed, for there to even be an issue of naturalization of
linguistics/semantics like (1) in the first place, some explicit criteria of “being physical” should be given,
so that the physical, so defined, can then serve as the “reduction base” for the course of naturalization as
sketched in (1). Providing an adequate definition of the physical is, however, anything but a trivial task, as
amply discussed by, e.g., Stoljar (2000, 2001, 2006). And it seems that past semantic naturalizers have not
confronted, much less resolved, this difficulty.
Loewer (1997) notes that most past semantic naturalizers take what is usually called “physicalism” as
their working hypothesis, which is also reflected by Fodor’s passage above. Physicalism is usually understood
as a philosophical doctrine which says that everything that exists is physical. Advocates of this doctrine
typically regard the physical as things and entities that can be identified with, or appropriately defined in terms
of, laws and entities postulated in contemporary physics. That is, they take ordinary scientific naturalism more
or less at face value, and this version of semantic naturalism is, then, aiming at physicalization of semantics.
At the time of Descartes, at least, there was in fact a naturalistic definition of the physical based on
mechanical philosophy. The physical (body, matter, etc.), as conceived in mechanical philosophy, is defined
as any material substance with three-dimensional spatial extension. Such material, and only such material,
can move and participate in contact mechanics. In Descartes’s view, “the extension in length, breadth, and
depth which constitutes the space occupied by a body, is exactly the same as that which constitutes the body,”
(Principles of Philosophy, II 10) and consequently, there cannot exist a space separate from a body, since
all spatial extension simply is the body (ibid, II 16). In pushing this hypothesis, Descartes was primarily
objecting to the then-dominant Scholastic and Aristotelian views of the world, in which mystical forces and
powers, “occult qualities” of sympathy, antipathy, and so on, affect all sorts of phenomena in the world. As
a consequence of his categorical rejection of the relevance of any such “occult” forces to physics, Descartes
hypothesized that all phenomena of motion are to be explained strictly in terms of immediate contact of
contiguous materials. Motion was defined as “the transfer of one piece of matter or of one body, from the
neighborhood of those bodies immediately contiguous to it and considered at rest, into the neighborhood of
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others” (ibid, II 25). Thus, he hypothesized that the causality of material phenomena is strictly closed, and
bodies can be affected only by other bodies through contact. The material world, according to this mechanical
view, is essentially conceived of as a machine, or a very grand automaton.
Mechanical philosophy is firmly grounded in our common-sense understanding of the nature and
interactions of objects, presumably genetically determined in large part (Chomsky, 2009). It has a number
of features that strongly appeal to our intuitive folk physics: persistence of objects through time and space,
causality through contact, bodies only being able to affect bodies, motion being able to produce nothing
but motion, and so on. These corollaries are so intuitively appealing and intelligible to our common-sense
understanding of the world that we often forget that this mechanical conception of the physical was effectively
demolished by one of Newton’s discoveries in the late 17th century. Specifically, Newton’s notion of gravity
affects objects at a distance, without any medium or body. Thus, his proposal was regarded by the leading
scientists of the day as the reintroduction of an “immaterial,” “occult” cause that Cartesian contact mechanics
had eliminated long before. The mechanical philosophical conception of the material world, where causality
among the physical is confined to immediate contact of the physical as a matter of principle, thus turned out
to be an incorrect scientific hypothesis, and so is our common-sense understanding of the world.
Ever since Newton undermined Cartesian mechanical philosophy, the concept of the ‘physical’, the
object of study in physics, has been subject to constant falsification, modification, extension and refinement,
consistently departing from people’s common-sense intuitions: Newton’s unified analysis of terrestrial and
planetary motion in terms of universal gravity lay beyond the bounds of mechanical philosophy, and thus
the domain of the physical needed to incorporate such an “occult” force as action at a distance (gravity); the
problem of explaining electricity and magnetism in terms coherent to Newtonian mechanics was deemed
unsolvable, and ultimately was effectively overcome by incorporating electromagnetic fields as physical
entities; the problem of accommodating chemistry to physics led to the introduction of even more complex
hypotheses about the nature of the physical world, e.g., quantum mechanics. In this course, our common-
sense beliefs and intuitions were shown to be irrelevant to natural science.
Then, there is little reason to contend that the scientific conception of the ‘physical’ provided by the latest
physics is complete and absolute by any means. Rather, one may well expect that the eventual unification
of any other currently divergent special sciences with physics may, if such a unification is ever forthcoming,
require a rather radical revision of physics and its conception of the physical.
Given these considerations, one should now be able to swallow the conclusion that there are no rigorous
criteria for what counts as physical that can constitute the reduction base for the naturalization of semantics
(1). On the one hand, if we invest the term ‘physical’ with our unanalyzed common-sense intuitions about
material substance, the relevance of such common-sense beliefs and concepts to scientific inquiry has been
shown to be scarce since Newton, so it has little use in the linguistic sciences. On the other hand, if we were to
incorporate the results of contemporary sciences into the conception of the physical (“scientific physicalism”),
then the ‘physical’ in such a conception would include whatever the best current scientific theories postulate,
to which we have no reason not to add principles and entities that the current “best theory” of generative
grammar postulates (SEM, for example). Then, the term ‘physical’ should be regarded as nothing more than
a rhetorical device of clarification, without any substantial import (Chomsky 2009). In either case, there
can hardly be any issue of ‘naturalization’ in the sense envisaged by traditional semantic naturalizers (i.e.,
reduction to the physical).
Why, then, do they concern themselves so persistently with semantic naturalism? It would not be out
of place to conjecture that they are still firmly entrenched in unanalyzed mind-body dualism. Presumably,
influenced by the traditional concern for the “mind-body problem,” once posed by Descartes as a naturalistic
research question but later dissolved by Newton, traditional semantic naturalizers still believe that their
investigation should not stay in such “occult” areas as “inside the head,” and that they must somehow let their
linguistic semantics relate to physical things in the outside world or observable behaviors of organisms, so
as to take advantage of the “safer” ontology of the latter. While such “physicalism” always exhibits a strong
appeal to our common-sense understanding of the world, it is no longer warranted as a natural scientific
framework, as pointed out above.
Then, traditional semantic naturalizers, by adhering to the reductionist project in (1), effectively commit
themselves to “the view that we must abandon scientific rationality when we study humans “above the neck”
(metaphorically speaking), becoming mystics in this unique domain, imposing arbitrary stipulations and a
priori demands of a sort that would never be contemplated in the sciences, or in other ways departing from
32
Narita Neo-Cartesianism in Generative Grammar
normal canons of inquiry” (Chomsky, 2000b:76), namely what is called methodological dualism.
3 Epistemological Cartesianism
3.1 Creative aspect of language use In the previous section, we saw that contemporary cognitive
scientists convince themselves of methodological un-Cartesianism, i.e., the conviction that there should be
no conceptual or methodological barriers that preclude serious inquiries into the mind in a way different
from other sciences of the physical. Methodological naturalism in generative grammar is one instantiation of
this neutral research attitude. At the same time, however, contemporary generative grammarians also respect
Descartes’s strategy to circumvent the problem of theoretically intractable human mental activities, as I will
point out in what follows.
At the time that Descartes was pushing his mechanical account of the world to its limit, he was also
aware that his mechanical explanation had certain limitations, which had to do with the creative aspect of
language use (Chomsky, 1966/2009). In the Discourse on the Method (1637), Descartes says:
[No animal or machine] could. . . use words, or put together other signs, as we do in order to
declare our thoughts to others. For we can certainly conceive of a machine so constructed
that it utters certain words, and even utters words which correspond to bodily actions causing
a change in its organs... But it is not conceivable that such a machine should produce different
arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in
its presence, as the dullest of men can do. (Descartes 1998: 32)
Specifically, taking his observation concerning the creative language use by normal people as a crucial piece
of evidence, he concluded that the human mind apparently goes beyond any mechanical account, and thus
human individuals cannot be modeled by any sort of automaton. This was the ground for his postulation
of res cogitans (the mind) as the second substance, counterposed to res extensa (body, the physical), only
the latter of which he hoped to explain mechanically. The Cartesian metaphysical mind-body dualism was
thus formulated as a naturalistic empirical hypothesis, and his “mind-body problem” was posed as a research
question for want of an eventual unification of these two domains of inquiry.
The Cartesian conception of the physical was shown to be untenable by Newton, who reintroduced the
“occult” notion of gravity to the causal theory of physical phenomena. Although Newton’s dissolution of
mechanical philosophy was then perceived with profound dismay by leading scientists of the day, and even
by Newton himself, it also had a certain positive effect, namely effectively undermining the conceptual barrier
that stood in the way of “natural sciences of the mind,” as we saw above.
However, we should bear in mind here that the characterization of res cogitans (the mental, whose effect
is most notably evidenced in the normal use of language) as a matter that does not withstand mechanical
scientific analysis was basically kept intact by Newton’s dissolution of the mechanical conception of the
body. In Chomsky’s (2000b:84) words, “Newton eliminated the problem of “the ghost in the machine” by
exorcising the machine; the ghost was unaffected.” And “the ghost,” i.e., the unbounded creativity of the
human mind as externalized in language use, seemed to remain as mysterious and scientifically unintelligible
as before.
Admittedly, the mystery of mental activities may never be overcome by human intelligence, due to its
own genetically imposed limitations. This possibility is argued for by McGinn (1991, 1993, 1999) among
others. In McGinn’s (1999:59) words, in relation to the hard problem of human consciousness (a favorite
topic for philosophers of the mind):
The conceptual skeleton that has served us so well in astronomy, physics, biology, mathematics,
and linguistics (give or take the odd nagging backache) will not support the weight of the
consciousness problem. Our scientific faculty thus has the wrong “grammar” to solve the
problem. It is precisely for this reason that we experience the problem as peculiarly deep, as
conceptual, as distinctively philosophical. It is why understanding consciousness is not just a
project within normal science. Not only do we need a “paradigm shift” to come to grips with
consciousness; we need a fundamentally new structure of thought.
Perhaps a more concrete characterization of the limitations of our science-forming capacity can be found in
Chomsky (1988:35-36).
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The production problem[, or] what I called “Descartes’s problem,” [is] the problem of accounting
for “the creative aspect of language use,” one aspect of the more general problem of accounting
for choice of action that is evoked by situations but not determined by them, as in ordinary,
normal human behavior, linguistic behavior included. About these problems, there is very little
to say. It seems, in fact, that the problems elude our conceptual grasp. We understand and can
deal with problems that can be formulated in terms of such notions as determinacy, randomness,
probability distributions and input-output systems, but as the Cartesians rightly stressed, these
concepts are not adequate or appropriate here. But we have no other concepts, and therefore
are at a loss as to how to proceed in this area. We do not know how to deal with action that
is unbounded in scope, indeterminate but not random, influenced but not caused by internal
states, evoked but not determined (even probabilistically) by situations, coherent and appropriate,
evoking thoughts in others similar to our own, and so on. As the Cartesians emphasized, humans
are only “incited and inclined” while mechanisms are “compelled” (randomness apart) to act
in certain ways in particular circumstances and under particular internal arrangement of parts.
These problems remain mysteries. They escape our conceptual grasp, and may lie beyond our
cognitive capacities and intellectual competence. At any rate, there is nothing very serious to say
[at the level of theoretical understanding] about the production problem, except in very limited
areas (e.g., the study of speech errors).
Thus, while our limited cognitive capacity might be well-suited to solving certain problems of determinacy,
randomness, probability, and input-output systems, there is no guarantee that the problem of creative language
use falls within these limited domains.
In retrospect, then, Descartes’s mechanical philosophy was offering an important epistemological
hypothesis, i.e., that the unbounded creativity of human mental acts is scientifically intractable. In what
follows, we will refer to this contention as epistemological Cartesianism. Although Descartes’s metaphysical
mind-body dualism was eliminated later, this particular epistemological contention has been accepted more
or less at face value by a number of cognitive scientists. In the course of establishing natural sciences of
the mind, cognitive scientists carefully avoided involving in their computational theories the complexities of
human free actions, a residue of res cogitans, a yet uncleared “ghost”: thus, cognitive scientists of vision
never ask how a particular human individual decides to use the visual system to, say, enjoy a movie or read a
book. And linguists have every reason to take the same course, too: thus, no one has succeeded in providing
an intelligible computational theory of how a particular human individual uses, say, the English expression
“It is hot here” to convey a request for a glass of Coke, a ticket to Iceland, or turning on an air conditioner.
Then, how can we proceed to construct a reasonable, explanatory theory of human language? It is
advisable for methodologically naturalistic (methodologically un-Cartesian) linguists to take the same course
as the ordinary sciences do. That is to say, one should start with obvious empirical facts, and define the object
of inquiry, as simple and clearly as one can, based on these factual observations. We will argue below that
this is exactly what generative grammarians do.
3.2 Grammar as a natural object One of the distinct characteristics of human beings is that each
individual, apart from serious pathology, can acquire one or more grammars of natural languages from a
finite amount of linguistic experience in his/her infancy. Considerations of the poverty of the stimulus (Plato’s
problem) convinced Chomsky and others to propose that the human mind possesses a substantive innate
mechanism that constitutes the basis of the acquisition/growth of such a linguistic capacity. This biological
endowment, the faculty of language (FL) as we call it, is reasonably assumed to be a distinct module of the
human mind, with its own internal rules and constraints. Generative grammar refers to an explicit scientific
theory of grammars as instantiations of FL. To emphasize its biological foundations, generative grammar is
nowadays also called biolinguistics (see Lenneberg 1967; Jenkins 2000).
Thousands of years of linguistic investigation share the belief, dating back as early as Aristotle, that the
grammar of natural language is in essence a system of pairings of “sound” (or “signs”) and “meaning.”
Cartesians further observed that the capacity to pair sounds and meanings in human language exhibits
unbounded creativity: humans can produce and understand an infinitude of expressions that go far beyond the
narrow range learned from direct experience, despite the fact that many expressions are previously unheard of
or too long and/or senseless to be produced. This Cartesian observation specifically led Chomsky (1955/1975;
1957, et seq.) to suppose that the grammar of human language must include, minimally, a system that
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recursively manipulates linguistic representations that can be assigned to corresponding sentences. This
minimally necessary component of grammar is usually called syntax. Contemporary generative grammarians
have concluded that syntax should include, at least as one of its components, Merge, a recursively applicable
operation that combines a finite number of linguistic forms into a larger form that it can further operate
on. Whether syntax consists of more than just Merge (say, labeling algorithms, Agree, etc.) or can be
optimally reduced to this single operation; whether it is distributed over many different subcomponents
with their own idiosyncratic rules and constraints (as assumed in, e.g., the so-called (Extended) Standard
Theory) or is confined to a single uniform component (Uriagereka, 1999; Chomsky, 1995b, 2000a, 2008);
how many interfaces it has with the neighboring performance systems; and what the exact nature of such
interface boundaries is; are all open empirical questions, which generative grammarians naturally debate in
various ways. However, no matter how these issues are ultimately settled, the biological existence of this
very generative capacity in the human mind/brain is beyond any doubt. This generative capacity, which
makes infinite use of Merge (and possibly other kinds of form-to-form mapping operations) to generate
linguistic forms in its humanly unique way, then, is a bona fide natural object that we can study as such,
taking whatever evidence is available. This natural object, presumably distinctively human, is appropriately
called (generative) grammar, and so is the naturalistic theory surrounding it, exploiting systematic ambiguity
associated with these terms (Chomsky, 1965). Thus, as long as we are studying grammar, in particular its
recursive-generative system (syntax), we are pursuing a natural science. More than sixty years of investigation
have shown, somewhat surprisingly, that this mind-internal natural object can be fruitfully investigated with
more or less the same rationale and methodology that have been adopted for other natural sciences (see
Chomsky 1955/1975, 1957, 1965, 1981, 1986, 1995a,b, 2000b, 2007a to name just a very few).
Another obvious fact is that the infinite forms that syntax generates are used to pair sound (or
sign) and meaning. More specifically, these forms can be used by an individual, appropriately and
meaningfully with regard to whatever purposes s/he might use them for, often (but not necessarily) with
corresponding ‘externalization’ (association with overt sounds or signs). This everyday observation justifies
another foundational assumption, namely that grammar can somehow interface with some ‘thought’ system
responsible for conceptual-intentional utilization of such syntactic forms, which we may call the Conceptual-
Intentional system (CI), as well as some articulatory-perceptual system responsible for their ‘externalization’,
or the Sensorimotor system (SM). It is hardly necessary to note that we have only a limited understanding of
the exact nature of CI or SM (though we have more ‘overt’ evidence for the latter). Still, at the bare minimum,
we should be able to conclude, from the above-mentioned everyday linguistic facts, that there must exist some
such interfaces to CI and SM. The interfaces to these systems are commonly referred to as SEM and PHON,
respectively.
Note that in this line of reasoning, we are passively postulating CI as a rather gross sum of performance
mechanisms that syntax can interface with on the ‘meaning’ side, for want of better understanding of how
human thought works. In doing so, generative grammarians hope that the inquiry into the nature of FL, when
developed, can eventually clarify something about the nature of this hypothetical construct (CI). But such
an expectation is in principle secondary to the scientific study of the forms and workings of grammar, since
grammar can generate forms regardless of how ‘meaningful’ they are for thoughts (cf. colorless green ideas
sleep furiously and countless other semantically anomalous examples). Whether the theory of grammar can
eventually meet such expectations will depend on the empirical progress and prospects it will yield in due
course. This is the nature of any scientific investigation: there is no a priori guarantee that we can construct
any explanatory scientific theory of how human grammar works, let alone how the forms it generates can be
utilized by the external performance systems.
That said, the fruitful results that more than half a century of investigation has borne constitute a reason
to be optimistic, to some extent, about such a prospect. And, of course, we are naturally interested in the
nature of SEM. What does SEM look like? How does syntax form SEM from an unorganized array of lexical
items? What kinds of instruction does SEM provide for CI? How strongly does SEM configure the ‘thought’
associated with the corresponding sentence? These are, again, all open empirical questions, to which we can
seek serious answers as our investigation proceeds, with the same rationale and methodology as are adopted
for empirical investigations into any other natural objects (Chomsky, 1995a).
3.3 Internalism as methodology In Section 2, we reviewed the traditional approach to the naturaliza-
tion of semantics (1), reproduced here.
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(1) Traditional approach to the naturalization of linguistics/semantics:
a. Assume what is “semantic” (i.e., entities and relations required by one’s prior conception of
linguistic semantics)
b. Assume the ontology of the “physical”
c. Provide re-characterizations of (a) in terms of either reduction to or supervenience on (b)
We saw that traditional semantic naturalizers are stuck with the ideology that the study of mental phenomena
such as linguistic semantics should be grounded by some ontology of the “physical,” even though they do not
provide any scientifically informative characterization of the physical that can serve as the reduction base for
their purpose, effectively committing themselves to methodological dualism.
The vicious doctrine of methodological dualism is counterposed to methodological naturalism, a
naturalistic approach to the mind, adopted by generative grammarians, that “investigates mental aspects
of the world as we do any others, seeking to construct intelligible explanatory theories, with the hope of
eventual integration with the “core” natural sciences.” (Chomsky, 2000b:76). For them, the starting point is
the empirically motivated biological existence of grammar: they discovered countless facts that demonstrate
the poverty of the stimulus (Plato’s problem), and demonstrated that these facts can only be explained by
attributing a substantial innate biological mechanism to the human mind/brain. They further discovered
that this biological mechanism must be somehow capable of making “infinite use of finite means” to derive
the discrete infinity of the human linguistic generative capacity (Wilhelm von Humboldt, see Chomsky
1966/2009; McGilvray 2009), which has led contemporary generative grammarians to conclude that the
biological mechanism in question should be characterized, at the bare minimum, by some sort of ‘recursive
function’ R. A further discovery was the pervasive ‘dislocation’ property of the recursive structure-generating
system, whose barest characterization is claimed Chomsky (2004) to be provided by identifying R with
Merge, whose unboundedness results in the bifurcation of external Merge (structure building) and internal
Merge (Move with the copy theory of movement; see Chomsky 1993, 1995b). Thus, at the present stage of
understanding, we put forward Merge and its recursive structure generation, viz. syntax, as an indispensable
principle of the best theory of grammar that unifies explanations of these foundational discoveries. As the
understanding of linguistic phenomena progresses, further elaboration of the theory of FL is forthcoming,
taking whatever evidence is or becomes available. And it is this empirical theory of generative grammar that
serves as the “first philosophy” of a methodologically naturalist inquiry into FL.
Now, apart from the issue of physicalism (step (1-b)), one may also take issue with the fact that traditional
semantic naturalizers typically start their investigation by presuming some prior conceptions of semantics,
deeply rooted in their philosophical doctrines. Such presupposed semantic theories vary across:
(2) a. representational, or referential semantics, i.e., the contention that linguistic representations in
human consciousness ‘re-present’ (or are ‘about’, or ‘refer to’) things in the world (Fodor 1987,
1990, 1994, 2008),
b. denotational semantics, i.e., the contention that each linguistic term is assigned as its semantic
value a ‘denotation’, characterized by the extension of the term or some Fregean abstraction
(Russell 1905; Frege 1997),
c. truth conditional semantics, i.e., the contention that for each language L, there is a truth theory
that can serve as the core of an adequate theory of meaning for L (e.g., Davidson 1967, 1969;
Montague 1974, rooted in Tarski’s (1936/1994; 1983) definition of truth),
d. sociological conception of linguistic meaning, i.e., the contention that meaning of linguistic
expressions, or their ‘normative’ usage, is primarily determined collectively by the speech
community (Lewis 1972; Putnam 1975; Dummett 1986),
and so on. The hypotheses in (2) are externalistic, in the sense that the semantic notions envisaged by these
hypotheses necessarily speak to various relations between language and mind-external things ‘out there’ (or
maybe some FL-external but still mind-internal representation of these things, for some of them). Indeed,
virtually all traditional semantic naturalizers’ theories can be characterized by one or another conjunction of
these ideas.
Once a semantic naturalizer buys any such externalist presuppositions as to the nature of language, the
problem of naturalization becomes more or less a matter of restating, in some sort of “physical” terms,
whatever semantic entities s/he is led by these presuppositions to posit. Consequently, s/he is further
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led to posit non-mental, i.e., externalist, notions like Dretske’s conception of information (Dretske, 1981;
Fodor, 1990), causal theory of reference (Kripke, 1980), community languages (communalects) (Putnam,
1975; Dummett, 1986), epistemically optimal conditions (Stampe, 1977; Stalnaker, 1984), Tarskian T(ruth)-
schemata (Tarski, 1936/1994, 1983) and so forth to fulfill the naturalization requirement (see Loewer 1997
for an overview). Consequently, the course of naturalization that most traditional semantic naturalizers
envisage takes the form of reduction as in (1), which arises as a consequence of their adoption of ideological
physicalism in step (1-b), along with the externalistic assumptions (2) for (1-a).
However, recall that we are now provided with the biological reality of generative grammar, in particular
syntax as its component that assures discrete infinity, for which the concern for naturalization does not arise,
insofar as the current best linguistic theory requires its existence (it is “physical,” according to scientific
physicalism). We should ask to what extent the externalist conceptions of linguistic semantics in (2) are to be
justified as naturalistic hypotheses to be incorporated into the science of grammar.
First of all, it should be stressed that the hypotheses in (2) are optional in the science of grammar, in that
rejection of one or even all of them does not affect the explanatory power of the science of grammar in any
significant way: we can proceed perfectly well to construct generative grammar just based on meaningless
sentences like colorless green ideas sleep furiously, which readily excludes bases for reference, truth-
conditions, practices of speech communities, etc. Compare the hypotheses in (2) with, e.g., foundational
assumptions in generative grammar, such as that there must be some genetically endowed innate mechanism
that maps finite linguistic data to attained I-languages (UG, the initial state of FL), that UG enables some
recursive generative device, for which Merge is currently the most promising candidate, and that this recursive
generative device somehow relates to CI and SM. There is likely to be no serious linguistic science that drops
either one of these assumptions, but, in contrast, none of the additional semantic hypotheses in (2) is essential
to that degree. Indeed, more than a half century of generative-biolinguistic inquiry has provided a number
of fruitful results and insights, essentially without any significant recourse to (2). These assumptions can be
optionally supplemented, if one wishes, but they suggest no alternatives to the science of generative grammar.
Moreover, we should also bear in mind that once one employs terms like reference, true, denote, and
others as scientific terminology, they become technical innovations, in which case they should be deprived
of common-sense intuitions, just like tensors, undecidability, Merge, or SEM in the technical sense. Hence,
we cannot factually test our intuitions against these hypothetical artifacts, which just mean exactly what
their inventors tell us they mean (cf. Chomsky 1995a:42, Chomsky 2000b:148). The gap between our raw
intuitions about referential properties of linguistic utterances and these stipulated-as-linguistic terminological
artifacts is still daunting (see also Chomsky 2003).
Further, if we decide to treat these externalist relations involving linguistic expressions and mind-
external things, then we are effectively stepping out of our biology, in particular the biologically real natural
object, viz. FL generative grammar. The resultant theory would not be properly biological anymore,
hence not biolinguistic or generative-grammatical. Of course, one’s going outside of human biology does
not necessarily entail going outside of the boundaries of serious naturalistic sciences. However, human
individuals can talk about virtually all sorts of things recognizable by the human mind. Thus, unless we
are given some independent characterization of what in the FL-external world can enter into such externalist
relations, the domain of these notions would be unbounded, which in effect makes such an ‘E-linguistic’
project a ‘theory of everything’, hence impossible or at best intractable, as pointed out by McGilvray
(1998:237). The (un)likelihood of such an ‘E-linguistic science’ is anyway orthogonal to the legitimacy
of the biological-computational science of generative grammar (biolinguistics, ‘I-linguistics’), since there is
no known evidence that the properties of the FL-internal computation, apart from use, are affected by FL-
external factors. Thus, that sort of ‘E-linguistic science’, if any, may be supplemented to but suggests no
alternative to I-linguistics (generative grammar). See a similar comment by Chomsky on sociolinguistics
(Chomsky 1995a:50, Chomsky 2000b:156). See also Lohndal & Narita (2009) for relevant discussion.
Then, if we want to avoid the intractability of unbounded creativity, whose nature may be forever beyond
human understanding (McGinn 1991, 1993, 1999 among others), it is perhaps not the best naturalistic
decision to start an inquiry into natural language semantics by presupposing that the science of meaning
must involve relations between linguistic expressions and FL-external things in the world, be they reference,
denotations, or truth-conditions. These assumptions are in need of strong empirical justification, even before
we should be concerned with “naturalizing” semantics, whatever that amounts to.
The question is, then, whether we can provide any substantial empirical support for the addition of any
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of the hypotheses in (2), to the extent that a theory with such additional hypotheses would still constitute
the best linguistic theory. We don’t know the answer a priori, so different researchers may bear different
expectations, while the obvious difficulty is to tease apart these aspects of linguistic behaviors from the
fundamentally intractable domain of creative language use. Therefore, some may well be skeptical about the
prospects for such a project, due to epistemological Cartesianism.
Contra various externalist projects in linguistics and philosophy, generative grammarians avoid the issue
of unbounded creativity by focusing on the organism-internal and mind-internal mechanism of language
(grammar), refraining from the use of it. This is what Chomsky (1995a, 2000b) calls the internalist approach
to language. By restricting their domain of inquiry to the internal mechanism, internalists attempt to preserve
their theory of grammar away from the intractability of unbounded creativity. In this regard, the internalist
approach to language amounts to “the methodological decision to study less, prior to studying more: to study
the organism, prior to the infinitely more complex task of studying how it embeds in a social, physical, and
cultural surrounding,” to borrow Hinzen’s words (2006a: 161) (see also Collins 2009).
3.4 The minimalist program as methodological naturalism As exercised by internalists, the method-
ological decision to keep to some existing scientific knowledge as a fixed starting point of inquiry is a rather
common strategy in the natural sciences. Indeed, the history of science shows that naturalistic inquiry
frequently proceeds without bothering much to find philosophical or metaphysical grounds for scientific
knowledge. Recall, e.g., that Newton famously remarked “I frame no hypotheses” as to his (regretful, to
him) inability to find the ultimate ground for the “immaterial” force of gravity in mechanical philosophy.
This suggestion was in fact the one that was followed in the post-Newtonian era quite generally, leading to
the situation where “[w]e have in our own days so accustomed ourselves to the abstract notion of forces, or
rather to a notion hovering in a mystic obscurity between abstraction and concrete comprehension, that we
no longer find any difficulty in making one particle of matter act upon another without immediate contact.”
(Lange, 1890:308)
To take another example, the unification of chemistry with fundamental physics was delayed until the
20th century, but even well before that, earlier chemistry seemed to proceed fairly well by letting “chemical
affinity be received as a first principle, which [they could not] explain any more than Newton could explain
gravitation,” and deferring “accounting for the laws of affinity, till [they] have established such a body of
doctrine as he has established concerning the laws of gravitation,” basically the course recommended by the
18th-century British chemist Joseph Black (cited by Schofield 1970:226; see also Chomsky 2003, 2009).
Indeed, as Friedman (1993:48) remarks, “the philosophers of the modern tradition are not best
understood as attempting to stand outside the new science so as to show, from some mysterious point outside
of science itself, that our scientific knowledge somehow ‘mirrors’ an independently existing reality. Rather,
[they] start from the fact of modern scientific knowledge as a fixed point, as it were. Their problem is
not so much to justify this knowledge from some ‘higher’ standpoint as to articulate the new philosophical
conceptions that are forced upon us by the new science.” The fact of scientific knowledge, whether generative-
biolinguistic or otherwise, can be regarded as no less than a body of reality in the natural world, and it is
not so much in need of philosophical justification from some ‘higher’ standpoint, say of brute ideological
physicalism, as it is to be discovered, not to be stipulated, in accordance with the naturalist rationale and
methodology.
The science of generative grammar proceeds where it is to proceed, with little need to await permission
from independently stipulated physicalism, whatever that amounts to. No progress is guaranteed a priori, let
alone any success, and, therefore, “we can do no more than seek ‘best theories’, with no independent standard
for evaluation apart from contribution to understanding, and hope for unification but with no advance doctrine
about how, or whether, it can be achieved.” (Chomsky 1995a:7, Chomsky 2000b:112) Researchers in this
discipline seek no more than to refine their theory of grammar in accordance with whatever empirical data
become available.
There is no a priori criterion for what counts as data relevant to linguistic inquiry; presupposing anything
of this sort would be a methodologically dualist move. We can only reasonably assume that there is still
something fundamentally unintelligible in mental aspects of the world that once led the Cartesians to postulate
the ‘second substance’ (res cogitans) and seek a metaphysical and methodological alternative to mechanical
scientific inquiry. This is the mystery of unbounded creativity, which most notably surfaces in the normal use
of language. The first and foremost difficulty for the science of the mind is, then, to discern a set of empirical
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observations that can be reasonably regarded as a systematic reflection of some deeper principle(s) of a mental
mechanism that allows uncaused and unbounded access by, but is still crucially organized distinctly from, the
unboundedness and creativity of the human mind. This is not a difficulty specific to the scientists of the mind,
but probably a more acute one, given that their objects of inquiry are, as it seems, in more ‘direct contact’
with such a ‘ghost’ than, say, gravity or electromagnetism are.
To respect this epistemologically Cartesian caution requires meticulous scrutiny, for the use of language
seems to be able to manufacture, taking various cues from experience, all sorts of artificial rule-systems
like science, religion, music, institutional laws, rules of language games and maybe even a certain amount
of ‘phonological’ or ‘semantico-morphological’ rules that may pervasively tuck in language production and
linguistically structured thoughts. We should be careful not to be confused by these artificial systematicities,
or intentionally regularized ‘mental behaviors’.
This methodological decision not to stipulate anything beyond what is virtually empirically necessary is
often referred to as the minimalist program for linguistic theory (Chomsky 1993, 1995b et seq.), but there
is nothing specifically linguistic about this research agenda. It is just another name for methodological
naturalism that takes epistemological Cartesianism seriously, which is in fact akin to the 17th century
Cartesian mechanical philosophy in nature, in that both of them are in their essence working methodologies
to find a proper domain for scientific inquiry. By limiting their domain of inquiry to res extensa, the 17th
century Cartesians carefully severed their sciences from the fundamental unintelligibility of human free
actions. Minimalist biolinguists continue to respect this very Cartesian methodology by remaining in the
realm of virtually empirically necessary mechanisms of the mind (i.e., grammar), carefully distinguished
from intractable unbounded creativity. They are, in this respect, quite Cartesian.
At the same time, however, minimalist-internalists are also methodologically un-Cartesian in not
confining the domain of their natural sciences to the prison of res extensa, taking advantage of Newton’s
dissolution of the metaphysical mind-body dualism. The minimalist program for generative grammar is,
then, a neo-Cartesian project, as we may call it.
It is rather a regrettable fact that the term “minimalism” is sometimes wrongly construed as a mystic or
even methodologically dualist doctrine that misguidedly disrespects empirical facts and incorporates vague
concepts like simplicity and optimality into the theoretical vocabulary, without serious empirical justification
(see, e.g., Kinsella & Marcus 2009; Kinsella 2009). But this is plainly a misinterpretation (Narita & Fujita,
2010). Minimalists are not mystics but, on the contrary, honest and serious realists: they decide not to
presuppose any methodologically dualist doctrine, and therefore, just in order to respect epistemological
Cartesianism, they decide to start from the limited set of postulates of valid virtual empirical necessity. It
is true that minimalists attempt to seek simplicity and optimality, whose conceptions are not yet clarified or
defined, but they do so, as any other natural scientists do, not as a matter of presupposed doctrine but as a
matter of working methodology, which was continuously found to be extremely useful in the entire history
of science from Galileo and other 17th century natural philosophers onwards.
Due to their epistemological Cartesianism, naturalist-minimalists try their best to eliminate recourse
to postulates that are not justified with certainty as virtually empirically necessary. In earlier frameworks
of generative grammar, there were a lot of theoretical constructs that were later shown not to count as
virtually empirically necessary, such as the varieties of government, the Empty Category Principle, D-
and S-structures, the bifurcation of phrase-structure rules and transformations, bar-levels in X-bar theory,
indices, and so on (Chomsky, 1995b, 2000a, 2004, 2007a). In the course of naturalistic inquiry, these
postulates were naturalistically accused of being theoretically redundant, descriptively inadequate, and/or
inherent stipulations that go beyond virtual empirical necessity. However, it should also be noted that they
were originally argued for by means of some real poverty-of-the-stimulus facts, many of which still pose
valid problems that await alternative explanations. The difficulty specific to generative grammar is again
quite naturalistic, which is that we haven’t yet come up with good theoretical postulates, other than Merge,
that crosscut and link the explanations for the remaining poverty-of-the-stimulus facts and are in themselves
demonstrated as virtually empirically necessary.
The same minimalist-internalist scrutiny should apply to the technical apparatus posited in the domain
of linguistic semantics, too, insofar as it is claimed to be part of FL and thus to be a topic that falls within
the purview of generative grammar. Take, for example, statements like “ ‘snow’ refers to (or represents
or denotes) snow,” or “ ‘John is hungry’ is true iff John is hungry.” Statements of these types constitute a
purported basis for contemporary model-theoretic denotational semantics, be it externalistic or posited in
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the form of FL-internal postulates. It is presumably true that an English speaker’s effortless understanding
of these statements owes quite a lot to some FL-internal mechanisms, including the SEMs assigned to
these English expressions. The generation by syntax of these SEMs is in turn based on the biologically
endowed semantic features (let’s dub them SEMs) of the lexical items (LIs) employed in these SEMs, such as
SEM(John), SEM(hungry), SEM(snow), in addition to SEM(refer), SEM(true), and so forth. On one hand,
there are indeed nontrivial poverty-of-the-stimulus arguments for the existence of the intrinsic semantic
features of these LIs—an English speaker comes to possess knowledge of what these LIs mean, in large
part without any conscious effort or any explicit training. On the other hand, there is presumably no
biologically endowed innate knowledge that contributes to the interpretations of denote, represent, or iff,
since these words are technical terms, whose references are set a posteriori by their innovators. And so
are the particular occurrences of terms refer to and true in these theory-laden statements. It is possible that
SEM(denote), SEM(represent), and SEM(iff) each represent an empty set, and the denotations of these terms are
supplemented a posteriori by creative language use in service of some particular human-made projects (e.g.,
formal semantic description). Correspondingly, we are not sure whether there are any facts of naturalistic
interest (such as the poverty of the stimulus) for statements of the sort “ ‘snow’ refers to (or re-presents or
denotes) snow,” or “ ‘John is hungry’ is true iff John is hungry.”
These comments, however, should not be taken by model-theoretic semanticists as discouragement.
There are indeed a number of professional journals and publications for contemporary semantics where a
growing number of interesting observations are descriptively presented for a number of particular words
and constructions in a variety of natural languages, many of which indeed seem to be valid poverty-of-
the-stimulus facts that await naturalistic explanations: discoveries of the conservativity of natural language
quantifiers, specificity and definiteness effects of various sorts, information-theoretic regularities, patterns and
conditions of structural entailment (downward or upward) sanctioning certain dependencies (say negative and
positive polarity), and various others. It is just that the commonly employed technologies like semantic types,
Fregean function applications and strict compositionality in terms of model-theory are so far not demonstrated
by some independent poverty-of-the-stimulus argument as virtually empirically necessary postulates. In
short, there are a number of valid empirical observations of semantic interest, but so far few postulates that
are demonstrated as virtually empirically necessary to unify and link explanations for these observations, a
situation that is quite commonly attested in any naturalistic inquiry.
It might be that the semantic postulates of the model-theoretic kind will be eventually demonstrated
as virtually empirically necessary by some crucial poverty-of-the-stimulus facts. Or it might be that the
postulates that are already demonstrated as virtually empirically necessary in the study of syntax, say Merge,
SEMs of LIs, and SEM, will contribute a lot to the eventual unification of the yet-unrelated explanations of
these empirical data, probably with radical modification and refinement of these postulates. This is just one
of the many unification problems that generative grammar faces.
3.5 Approaching semantics from below One of the questions that generative grammar faces is:
(3) How much of the interpretive/semantic properties of a given linguistic form (sentence, noun phrase,
etc.) is determined (‘carved out’) by the syntactic generation of its SEM?3
As Hinzen (2008) points out,
[T]he philosophical and linguistic answer to [(3)] for nearly 700 years has arguably been: by and
large, nothing. Ever since the nominalists under Occam’s lead demolished Modistic Universal
Grammar in the early 14th century, language was largely regarded as an arbitrary means to
express thought: It is deprived of any intrinsic relation to either the structure of the thoughts
conveyed or, for that matter, the external world out there, which language can be used to describe.
It is a tool for conveying thought, not its cause. If so, language is deprived of the role it was given
by the Modists: that of an instrument of knowledge, a format in which systematic knowledge of
the world is possible. (Hinzen, 2008:349-350)
However, the advent of generative biolinguistics, or specifically its recognition of grammar (FL) as a natural
object, has opened up a fresh way to address question (3). Indeed, (3) has become one of the leading
3 Hinzen (2008:349) proposes to call this question Uriagereka’s question (Uriagereka 2008; see also Narita 2009b).
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research questions in generative grammar since Chomsky’s (1955/1975) influential analysis of constructional
homonymity (structural ambiguity) (see Chomsky 1955/1975; 1957). Now that we are given the biological
existence of generative grammar and its SEM-interface, it becomes an open question for human biology
what aspects of CI-interpretation of a sentence or a phrase are configured by the syntactic derivation of its
associated SEM.
Again, numerous facts about constructional homonymity already suggest that the contribution of syntax
to CI-interpretation is solid and nontrivial. Moreover, Hale & Keyser (1993, 2002) convincingly argue that
the argument structure and θ-theoretic properties of lexical items are largely determined by syntax, a leading
idea that has fostered much subsequent research. Further, Borer (2005a,b, 2017), in articulating her exo-
skeletal approach to the syntax-CI interface, convincingly argues that the CI-interpretations assigned to lexical
items are not fully determined by their intrinsic features statically stored in the lexicon but rather strongly
configured by the hierarchical structuring of SEM within which they are embedded. Chomsky (2004, 2007a,
2008) also observes that the duality of semantics (conceptual, θ-theoretic, “D-structure” interpretations v.s.
computational, discourse-related, “S-structure” interpretations), one of the pervasive features of CI, correlates
rather closely with the bifurcation of external and internal Merge (see also Narita 2009a, 2014).
Building on these results, an even stronger position is argued for by Hinzen (2006b; 2007; 2008)
and Uriagereka (2008). According to their view, syntax is not a tool for expressing independently
constructed propositional thoughts. Rather, syntax lies at the heart of the generation of such humanly
possible propositional thoughts, and certain empirical properties of thought contents derive from the dynamic
configuration of SEM by syntax (Uriagereka’s 2008 radical co-linearity thesis; see also Hinzen 2008; Narita
2009b).4 For example, the structural coherence and independence of CPs at the mapping of syntax to SEM
perhaps play a crucial role in explaining why ‘propositions’ so prominently arise, to our mind, as units
of semantic analysis. Rather than stipulating them as given, we might be able to “deflate” such mysterious
entities “into the notion of a CP” (Hinzen, 2006b:179-180), and we might also envisage more or less the same
sort of deflation with respect to other postulated entities of thought, too, such as events, seemingly closely tied
to vP, referentiality, to DP, and so on. More generally, it is “as if syntax carved the path interpretation must
blindly follow.” (Uriagereka 1999:275/2002:64, Hinzen 2006b:250, Chomsky 2007a:15) The consequence
of their claim is that syntax is the generative engine that provides the forms of humanly possible linguistically
structured thoughts. Effectively, syntax therefore is a theory of semantics (see Hinzen 2006b, 2007, 2008,
Uriagereka 2008; see also Narita 2009b).
Hinzen and Uriagereka’s notion of the strong co-linearity of syntax and semantics is, again, an empirical
hypothesis that is to be contested with many other hypotheses concerning the syntax-semantics interface.
Only future empirical inquiry will advise us whether this is an adequate theory of human semantics with
empirical support or rather misguided.
I would like to here emphasize one important prospect that the Hinzen-Uriagereka approach holds. As
we have noted above, the discrete infinity of human sentences and many other facts amply support the
biological existence of syntax, and thus its generation of CI-interpretable representations (SEM). They are,
then, bona fide natural objects “that we can study as such, even though we see them, somewhat miraculously,
systematically condition properties of linguistic meaning that we can empirically attest.” (Hinzen, 2006b:235)
Then to the extent that certain properties of linguistic meaning associated with SEM are shown to be carved
out by syntax along the lines suggested by Hinzen and Uriagereka, they are ‘naturalized’, or specifically
biologized, thanks to the ‘safe’ ontology of syntax and SEM that the usual scientific realism naturally assigns
to them.
Chomsky refers to the research program initiated by Hinzen and Uriagereka as “a novel approach to what
has been called ‘naturalization of meaning’.” (2007a:15; see Hinzen 2006b:235; see also McGilvray 1998,
4 Hinzen & Sheehan (2013) and Hinzen (2014) propose the term un-Cartesian linguistics to refer to the research program
that pursues the radical co-linearity of language and thought in the sense defined here. Hinzen’s un-Cartesian hypothesis
thus holds that “the cognitive mechanism generating human-specific thought and those generating language should be the
same,” and that “language thereby becomes a principle of cognitive organization and no separate theory of human-specific
thought is required.” (Hinzen, 2014:227). Perhaps we may coin some term, like language-thought un-Cartesianism, to
refer to this contention. In contrast, the Cartesian hypothesis, as defined by Hinzen & Sheehan (2013), holds that “thought
is universal and immutable in this species, while language is merely a contingent way of expressing it in a physical
medium” (xvi), though, in the same place, they also admit that “Descartes himself may never have defended it” (xvi). See
also note 8.
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2002, 2009) It can be summarized as follows:
(4) The generative grammar-based approach to the naturalization of semantics:
a. Assume the ontological reality of generative grammar as a natural object
b. Provide empirical characterizations of syntax and SEM as the science of generative grammar
leads to
c. Provide sufficient characterizations of interpretive/semantic properties of linguistic meanings
determined by the generation of SEM, to the extent that this move is feasible and empirically
reasonable at all
In articulating the research program in (4), Hinzen and Uriagereka are suggesting that we can build on the
natural science of generative grammar as our fixed starting point, and seek to see how much it can tell us
about the characteristics of natural language semantics. At least some aspects of natural language semantics
have been already known to be carved out by syntax, leaving the question as to exactly how much of it is
carved out by syntax (question (3)) open to further empirical inquiry.
4 Metaphysical trans-Cartesianism
In the preceding discussion, we argued that the minimalist-internalist program for generative grammar is
both methodologically un-Cartesian and epistemologically Cartesian, in that it rejects Descartes’s mind-body
dualism as a conceptual and methodological barrier for cognitive sciences, while it nevertheless respects
Descartes’s advice to avoid insurmountable complexities of unbounded creativity. Before concluding the
paper, I would also like to briefly attend to the fact that contemporary minimalist biolinguistics further aims
at discovering the so-called “third-factor” principles, i.e., domain-general laws of nature that are not specific
to language. I would like to claim that this aspect of the minimalist-biolinguistic program is metaphysically
trans-Cartesian, in that it attempts to overcome the traditional Cartesian mind-body dualism and redefine
their domain of inquiry in such a way that it cross-cuts physical as well as mental aspects of the world.
Each natural science has its own domain of inquiry, which is characterized by the virtually empirically
necessary postulates for that domain. As for generative grammar, one of the most important discoveries is
that Merge is a virtually empirically necessary operation that provides explanations for some of the crucially
relevant and previously seemingly disparate empirical facts. Current generative-(bio)linguistic inquiry tends
to take the form of pushing the ‘Merge-only’ hypothesis, which seeks to reduce as many theory-internal
postulates to Merge as possible (Chomsky, 2007a,b; Berwick, 2011; Berwick & Chomsky, 2015; Kato et al.,
2016; Narita et al., 2017; Narita & Fukui, forthcoming), for the simple reason that so far linguists have not
succeeded in pinning down any other theoretical construct as virtually empirically necessary as Merge.
However, it is not true that generative grammarians have nothing other than Merge to rely on to
investigate their domain of inquiry. In this context, consider Newton’s dissolution of the metaphysical mind-
body dualism again: as we have seen, Newton’s destruction of res extensa in effect demolished the conceptual
barrier for the possibility of natural sciences of res cogitans. What is more, it also effectively emancipated
the domain of the laws of physics from the prison of res extensa. The mind-body dualism declined, and we
were explicitly told by Newton that we have no valid metaphysically closed framework of the physical that
partitions off the domain of application of physical laws as a matter of principle. This conclusion troubled
traditional Cartesians a great deal, and Newton was then very often accused of his reintroduction of the
immaterial occult force to the domain of physics. But, for the purpose of pursuing cognitive sciences, we
can regard this Newtonian conclusion as rather advantageous. Specifically, there is no longer a well-defined
boundary of the coherent physical domain in the post-Newtonian era. Correspondingly, then, there is no
longer any principled reason to exclude the possibility that the set of laws of physics, chemistry, theories
of computation, and all other natural sciences are also applicable to the domain of the mind as well. We
can only conjecture, as the Cartesians did, that unbounded creativity still resists explanations in terms
of these physical laws, but the possibility becomes an open empirical question for the discovered mental
mechanisms, subtracted from creative use. There are indeed quite a few general laws of nature that have been
discovered and independently justified by physicists and other scientists as virtually empirically necessary in
their respective domains of inquiry.
The set of domain-general laws of nature that figure in and affect the structure of human language, but are
not specific to it, is now commonly referred to as the third factor of language design: ‘third’, because it is in
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addition to the first factor (genetic endowment specific to human language) and the second factor (experience)
of language design (Chomsky, 2005, 2007a, 2008). The null hypothesis is that general laws of nature are also
applicable to the mental aspects of the world. This conclusion is even required by a physicalist statement
of the sort “everything that exists in the world is physical.” The successful progress of physics in the 20th
century adds another historical plausibility argument for such a null hypothesis. Indeed, the inapplicability
of such generalized laws of nature to a certain domain, e.g. language, would be a nontrivial empirical finding
that requires explanation.
That said, the nature of the third factor that enters into generative grammar is admittedly quite ill-
understood at this early stage of biolinguistic inquiry. But there are already some proposals. For example,
consider the principle of economy of derivation proposed by Chomsky (1995b:138-145):5
(5) Principle of economy of derivation:
For each pair P of SEM and PHON, syntax chooses the least costly derivation to generate P, where the
cost of derivation is determined by some syntax-internal metric, such as the number of derivational
steps (Merge, Agree, etc.).
Fukui (1996) points out that this economy principle can be regarded as the linguistic (and hence discrete)
version of Hamilton’s Principle of Least Action, a fundamental unifying minimum principle in physics from
which numerous laws in various subfields of physics can be deduced, including the laws of mechanics, optics,
electricity, and magnetism.6,7
An important corollary of the principle of economy of derivation is that there can be no superfluous
derivational step in a given syntactic derivation that does not contribute to some interpretive outcome at CI.
Building on this consideration, Narita (2009a) postulates a strong syntax-semantics co-linearity thesis, which
he calls Derivational Full Interpretation (DFI):
(6) Derivational Full Interpretation (DFI) (Narita 2009a:240,(50)):
Every syntactic operation correlates with interpretation at CI.
Adopting Pietroski’s (Pietroski, 2005, 2007, 2008, to appear) conjunctivist semantics reviewed above, Narita
claims that Merge of X and Y correlates with, or even maybe just is, the ‘&’-conjunction of SEM(X) and
SEM(Y) at CI. He further claims that X’s θ-marking Y at CI correlates with minimal search (Agree) of an
edge-feature from X to Y in syntax, and that from the assumption that the mode of application of the relevant
θ-marking operation is constrained by the principle of economy of derivation, we can deduce the effect of
the so-called θ-Criterion, a condition that any argument category must receive one and only one θ-role. He
further claims that the observation that any optional application of internal Merge is required to yield some
new discourse-related interpretation (see Reinhart 1997, 2006; Fox 2000; Chomsky 2001) can be seen as
another corollary of DFI.
It is significant to observe that the principle of economy of derivation (5), as a likely corollary of a law of
nature (Hamilton’s Principle of Least Action), leads generative grammar to adopt a more transparent syntax-
semantics mapping, such as DFI (see Uriagereka 2008 for a different approach). The relevant properties of
CI-interpretation are thus, as we may claim, ‘naturalized’ by natural law, the third factor of language design.
Another potential example of the third-factor principles is the principle of symmetry in nature, whose
relevance to generative grammar is discussed in Narita & Fukui (forthcoming) (see also Jenkins 2000; Citko
2011; Fukui 2011; Fukui & Narita 2017; Narita & Fukui 2016). It has been widely recognized in physical
sciences that nature favors symmetry. We observe an infinitude of symmetric patterns in the universe, from
the endless forms of biological organisms (spheres in cell division, bilateral designs of skeletons, etc.) to the
structures and trajectories of inorganic matters (snowflakes, elliptic orbit of planets, etc.). Capitalizing on
such observations, many mathematicians and physicists have become convinced that symmetry is indeed an
overarching principle of the physical world (see, e.g., Weyl 1952).
Mathematically speaking, symmetry of a natural object O can generally be characterized as invariance
5 Some researchers claim that the domain of such economy considerations is localized to well-defined parts of a given
derivation, e.g., phases (Chomsky, 2000a, 2008). See also Collins (1997); Uriagereka (1999).
6 One of the familiar examples is the effect of Fermat’s Principle of Least Time in optics, which states that a ray of light
in traversing a route from one point to another follows the path that requires least time.
7 See Al-Mutairi (2014) for critical discussion. See also Narita (2017).
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of O under some transformation T. If O consists of n components, C1, ..., Cn , then, applications of T never
affect the internal properties or relations of C1, ..., Cn . In other words, for O = {C1, ..., Cn} to be symmetric,
it is necessary that there exists some property or relation that holds of C1, ..., Cn that stays invariant under T.
Narita & Fukui (forthcoming) call this necessary condition of symmetry extrinsic uniformity.
(7) Extrinsic Uniformity of Symmetric Objects:
An object O = {C1, ..., Cn} is extrinsically uniform =def. For some transformation T, there exists some
property P or relation R that holds of C1, ..., Cn and stays invariant under T.
For example, a regular hexagon (instantiated by snowflakes honeycombs, etc.) is extrinsically uniform, given
that being of the same length k holds of its six sides, and this property/relation stays invariant under, say, a
reflection transformation. Similarly, a starfish is extrinsically uniform, given its five arms are of the same
length, shape, etc., that stays invariant under, say, a 72◦ rotation.
The condition in (7) is a relatively weak, but still necessary. In addition to (7), Narita & Fukui
(forthcoming) propose that we can also define a stronger notion of uniformity. Specifically for objects in
nature, organic or inorganic, we can distinguish, among many other possible transformational operations,
the very generative procedure GP that is directly at stake in the formation of those objects. We will define
invariance of C1, ..., Cn with respect to GP as intrinsic uniformity.
(8) Intrinsic Uniformity of Symmetric Objects:
An object O = {C1, ..., Cn} is intrinsically uniform =def. For the generative procedure GP that yields
O, all the properties and relations assigned by GP equally hold of its components, C1, ..., Cn , i.e., no
property P or relation R assigned by GP makes a component Ci distinct from any other component
Cj (1 ≤ i,j ≤ n, i 6= j).
For instance, consider the process of cell division. It can be understood as a generative procedure GP
that applies to a cell C and yields a pair of identical duplicates of C: GP(C) = {C1, C2}. Here, the object
{C1, C2} is intrinsically uniform, given that C1 and C2 share the exact same properties of shape, chemical
compositions, etc. To take another example, consider the process of recursive branching in snowflake-
formation. Details aside, it consists of a series of molecule arrangements, driven by hydrogen bonds and
other physical conditions, that collectively shape 6 branches. If we call the composite of these processes GP,
then a snowflake O consisting of six branches B1, ..., B6 is intrinsically uniform, given that B1, ..., B6 are
identical with respect to the properties assigned by GP (hexagonal shape, chemical compositions, etc.), and
no property or relation assigned by GP to B1, ..., B6 makes Bi distinct from any other Bj (1 ≤ i,j ≤ 6, i 6= j).
It is certainly not true to say that every object in nature is intrinsically or extrinsically uniform.
The human body, for instance, is not completely intrinsically uniform, due to dominant right-handedness,
asymmetrically positioned intestines, etc. After all, perfect symmetry is rarely observed in the real world, for
multiple reasons such as fluctuating external conditions, accidental damage, etc. That said, it is also true that
nature exhibits cases where intrinsically uniform objects are formed, especially in idealized environments,
where extrinsic conditions not directly relevant for the generation are appropriately controlled. For such
cases, we may say that the relevant procedure GP satisfies the Symmetry Principle.
(9) Symmetry Principle:
GP yields intrinsically uniform outputs.
Narita & Fukui (forthcoming) propose that several (or, perhaps, all) generative procedures within human
language can also be shown to satisfy the Symmetry Principle. They claim that the operation Merge, be it
formulated as the familiar binary version (10) or an unbounded n-ary one (11), is a GP satisfies the Symmetry
Principle.
(10) Merge(α, β) = {α, β}
(11) Merge(Σ1, ..., Σn ) = {Σ1, ..., Σn} (n > 0)
In the case of binary set-formation in (10), for example, no structural relations assigned to α and β, such as
term-of and sister-of, make α or β distinct from the other: they are equally terms of the output O = {α, β},
they are mutually sisters of each other, and no asymmetric relation, such as precedence, is assigned to the
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pair of α and β to make one distinct from the other (contra, e.g., Kayne 2011; Zwart 2011). In this sense, the
output of the GP Merge ((10) or (11)) does satisfy intrinsic uniformity.
Narita & Fukui (forthcoming) argue that Merge takes the form it does, perhaps because its emergence
is, evolutionarily and/or developmentally, critically conditioned by the Symmetry Principle, a third-factor
principle whose domain of application surely ranges over the physical world. So long as this hypothesis is on
the right track, we may say that Merge is, in a certain sense, “physicalized” via the fundamental principle of
nature. For discussion, see Narita & Fukui (forthcoming), who further propose that the effect of the Symmetry
Principle widely extends to other parts of generative grammar.
As we have seen, minimalist-internalists are honest and serious realists who start their inquiry from the
limited set of virtually empirically necessary postulates, including the language-specific Merge-operation and
empirically successful postulates borrowed from other naturalistic inquiries (the third factor). To the extent
that effects of the physical laws of nature penetrate the domain of FL (grammar), this mental mechanism is
naturalized/‘physicalized’, in a way quite different from how traditional semantic naturalizers’ reductionism
couched in ideological physicalism. It certainly goes beyond the Cartesian mind-body dualism, though
not really in the way Descartes envisaged: while the minimalist-internalists fully respect epistemological
Cartesianism (circumventing unbounded creativity), the third-factor principles they seek overarch and cross-
cut metaphysical mind-body dualism, governing both physical and mental aspects of the world. In this
manner, the pursuit of the third factor can be regarded as metaphysically trans-Cartesian.
To what extent the pursuit of such “naturalization” of grammar (metaphysical trans-Cartesianism) is
feasible and plausible is an open empirical question, to which we cannot and should not provide any a
priori answer. Again, due to the still-daunting intractability of unbounded creativity, we can only reasonably
proceed to address this question by sticking to and refining our set of virtually empirically necessary
postulates, taking whatever evidence is or becomes available.
5 Concluding remarks
The possibility of natural sciences of the mind was opened up by the 17th century scientific revolution,
where natural science came to take its modern shape. The conceptual barrier precluding such a naturalistic
inquiry was first posed as a by-product of Descartes’s mechanical philosophy, but was later eliminated by
Newton. However, even today, the mystery of unbounded creativity essentially remains much in the same
form as Descartes observed with puzzlement, and the serious naturalistic inquiry into the nature of mind
is presumably only possible when the issues of unbounded creativity are avoided even in the study of
mental aspects of the world. Thus, natural sciences of the mind are methodologically un-Cartesian while
epistemologically Cartesian, in that they reject Descartes’s metaphysical mind-body dualism, while they
nevertheless respect Descartes’s strategy to avoid the complexity and intractability of unbounded creativity.
Further, some such sciences can also be metaphysically trans-Cartesian, in that they take full advantage of
the dissolution of mind-body dualism and seek to find physical (“third-factor”) principles that cross-cut both
physical and mental aspects of the world.
In this squib, I argued that generative grammar under the rubric of the minimalist program is essentially
such a neo-Cartesian project, whose three distinct characteristics can be summarized as follows.
(12) Neo-Cartesianism in generative grammar:8
a. Methodological un-Cartesianism:
the conviction that there is no conceptual or methodological barrier preventing natural sciences
of the mind, contra Cartesian mind-body dualism.
b. Epistemological Cartesianism:
the conviction that the unbounded creativity of human mental acts (some of which are
externalizable in speech) lies beyond our scientifically tractable domains of inquiry.
c. Metaphysical trans-Cartesianism:
the conviction that we can fully take advantage of the dissolution of mind-body dualism, and
seek to find physical (“third-factor”) principles that cross-cut both physical and mental aspects
8 Perhaps Hinzen & Sheehan (2013) and Hinzen (2014) language-thought un-Cartesianism discussed in note 4 may
constitute the fourth component of neo-Cartesianism, although it may not be as essential to generative grammar as the
other three components listed here.
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of the world.
Neo-Cartesian (bio)linguists start from empirical observations, notably on the poverty of the stimulus, that
clearly demonstrate the existence of nontrivial innate knowledge, and they take as real whatever theoretical
postulates are shown to be virtually empirically necessary, without caring much about philosophical
justification of them by means of, say, crude ideological physicalism. There is nothing special about this
line of approach; it is common practice in most of the natural sciences. It is methodological naturalism.
It was pointed out that there is currently no interesting conception of physicalism that can pose a
complete and coherent boundary of the physical for which physics can in principle provide explanations.
Correspondingly, we have no principled boundary between ‘physical sciences’ and ‘mental sciences’. The
situation is, then, just that there are a number of partially or completely (un)related empirical observations in
the physical and mental aspects of the world, each of which potentially indicates the ontological reality
of some virtually empirically necessary postulates, be they general relativity, electromagnetic fields, the
Principle of Least Action, Merge, quanta, prime numbers, LIs, θ-roles, or whatnot. We can do no more
than to seek the best theories of the given set of empirical observations, making use of whichever of these
postulates are found useful, without presupposing any stipulations as to how general each postulate’s domain
of application can be.
Methodologically speaking, then, all the existing sciences are, more or less, unified under the general
rubric of the methodological naturalism, and the challenge that remains is to find true linking hypotheses
that provide explanations for one or more of these observations, probably with substantial modification and
refinement of the postulates that have been thought of as virtually empirically necessary. No progress is
guaranteed, let alone any success, but this has been, again, and always will be, the norm for naturalistic
inquiry.
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